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Abstract
In the standard emission problem, each country’s ruling party decides on an optimal level of emis-
sions by analyzing the cost and benefit to the country. However, such policy decisions are often in-
fluenced by political parties’ incentives to be elected. Voters tend to give higher priority to economic
issues than they do to environmental ones. As a result, political parties have additional incentives to
reach a critical economic benefit level, at a cost of higher emission level, in order to satisfy voters’ ex-
pectations in economic issues. Therefore, this study explores the implications of political parties being
averse to insufficient economic performance relative to a critical economic target level on sustaining
an international environmental agreement on emission levels. In doing so, we allow countries to have
asymmetric concerns about economic targets, as well as asymmetric technology levels. We find that
stronger concerns about economic targets deter the most cooperative emission levels countries could
jointly sustain. Furthermore, technological asymmetry could either deepen or offset this impact. These
results suggest that efforts on achieving substantial international environmental agreements should be
supported at the citizen level to eliminate the adverse effects.
Keywords: Emission Problem; Economic Targets; Loss-Aversion; International Environmental Agree-
ments; Repeated Game.
JEL classification: Q50; Q58; D03
Politics is too serious a matter to be left to the politicians.
—Charles de Gaulle
1 Introduction
In many economic models, we assume that governments make optimal choices for their country by taking
into account the benefits and the costs to the country. However, in reality governments’ objectives often
differ from their countries’, since they have additional incentives to be re-elected. In this paper, we argue
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that similar situation also exists when governments decide on their emission cuts. It is widely known
that political parties consider economic benefits to be of greater importance, since these benefits are more
visible and certain to voters than are the results of environmental policies.1 As a result, they would
have additional incentives to introduce some populist policies in order to achieve some economic targets.
Political parties could perceive these targets as critical levels below which voters would be unsatisfied
with the economic performance. Furthermore, political parties would be averse to perform poorly in
these economic aspects, since it might cost them the next election. For example, an increase in tax, say
on gasoline, could be better for the country but not eventually implemented due to such distortionary
incentives of the ruling party. In this paper, we aim to understand the implications of such possibly
relevant incentives on international environmental cooperation.
To model this, we assume that political parties perceive economic benefits from emission not only in
absolute levels but also as gains or losses relative to their economic targets, and that they are averse to
insufficient economic performances. More specifically, economic targets are reference levels such that, if
a country’s economic benefit from emissions is higher than its economic target, then its leaders find the
economic performance sufficient (i.e., a gain). However, if the benefit is less than its economics target,
then its leaders find the economic performance insufficient (i.e., a loss). Thus, this paper introduces
the widely used phenomena of reference levels and loss-aversion into the international environmental
cooperation.
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) argue that people perceive outcomes as gains and losses relative to
a reference level, which may be current assets, the status-quo, or expectations, rather than final wealth
or a welfare level. Furthermore, people exhibit loss-aversion, which is the tendency to strongly prefer
avoiding losses to acquiring gains. The theory of loss-aversion has been employed to provide insight into
various phenomena such as in financial markets (Benartzi and Thaler, 1995), consumption and saving
behavior (Bowman et al., 1999), housing markets (Genesove and Mayer, 2001), voter behavior (Alesina
and Passarelli, 2014) at the individual level; and also, in international trade (Freund and Ozden, 2008)
and political parties’ election platform changes (Schumacher et al., 2015) at the government level.
More specifically, Schumacher et al. (2015) explain why governments change their election platform
more than opposition parties. They argue and find empirical evidence that parties with low aspiration
change more when they are in government than in opposition due to loss-aversion. For example, when
the German Green Party moves into office first time as the coalition partner of Social Democratic Party in
1998, they changed its platform significantly. In short, the economic issues became more important, while
the environmental ones became less important. Even though it costed the party some activist and many
loyal voters, it was able to remain as an attractive coalition partner and achieved highest nationwide votes
ever.2 In additional to Schumacher et al. (2015), Simon (1985) also argues that political parties exhibit
bounded rationality, especially when decisions are complex. Bendor et al. (2011), in their recent book
on behavioral theories of election, show that political parties and/or voters’ aspiration (reference) levels
1For instance, the following link describes recent surveys that show how voters’ prioritize economic issues more highly than
they do environmental issues in the United States. http://www.pollingreport.com/prioriti.htm
2See the supporting information provided in Schumacher et al. (2015) for more detailed political history of the German
Green Party.
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influence party competition, turnout, and voters’ choices of candidates.
Alternatively, political parties can be rational. Still, similar impacts on achieving economic targets can
be observed if they take actions to maximize not only the net benefit to the country, but also their own
private interests (Besley, 2006; Persson and Tabellini, 2000). Rational political parties may be reluctant
to change to greener policies if voters are averse to economic losses (Alesina and Passarelli, 2014), or if
they are influenced by special interest groups (Grossman and Helpman, 1994). In the latter case, parties
may strive to reach an economic target because of industrial lobbyists, who are possibly stronger than
the green lobbyists, expecting some economic targets to be achieved.3 As a result, to be elected, political
parties would value the economic benefits from emissions more highly in order to satisfy some economic
targets, thus, to attract voters or special interest groups.4
Several studies examine how behavioral economics can advance the science of environmental and
resource economics, and note that loss-aversion could be crucial for non-market valuations (Shogren
et al., 2010) and whether climate change is framed as a loss or a gain (Gsottbauer and van den Bergh,
2013). To the best of our knowledge, I˙ris¸ and Tavoni (2015) is the only other study (a work in progress),
which employs loss-aversion to examine international environmental agreements. They investigate the
impact of loss-aversion with respect to a threshold amount of environmental damage, which is viewed
as indicative of an approaching catastrophe. Our study differs significantly from that of I˙ris¸ and Tavoni
(2015), because the latter focuses on coalition formation, and particularly the size of coalitions and the
types of countries that form a coalition in the case of asymmetry in their beliefs on environmental safe
operating limits (references) and in their perceived vulnerability when a threshold is exceeded (loss-
aversion).
A country’s economic target could be determined, among others, by its past performance and targets,
current and expected future performances, performances of other countries, and political parties’ decla-
rations. For instance, overly-optimistic declarations might cause ambitiously high economic targets,5 and
while economic busts lower the voters’ expectations, it also raises attention in economic issues relative
to environmental ones and, thus, can increase the economic targets.6 In this paper, we assume coun-
tries’ economic targets and economic target concerns (i.e., how much are targets valued comparing to
the benefit and the cost of emissions and, how averse political parties are to insufficient economic per-
formances) to be exogenous and allow them to differ between the countries. Furthermore, we also allow
countries to differ in their development levels, particularly in their technology levels. In this context, a
3Dietz et al. (2012) study the implications of domestic lobbying, particularly on IEAs. See also Oates and Portney (2003) for
a review of lobby groups on environmental policies.
4Buchholz et al. (2005) provide a theoretical examination of the implications of the electoral process for IEAs, and find signif-
icant adverse effects. Based on empirical evidence, Cazals and Sauquet (2015) show that political leaders’ levels of commitment
to IEAs differ with the timing of elections. In our model, we abstract completely from the electoral process and focus on the
potential consequences.
5Miler (2009), using personal interviews with political elites and a quasi-experimental design, finds that politicians often use
decision heuristics and suffer from over-optimistic forecasts. Similarly, Frankel (2011) studies the forecasts of real growth rates
made by official government agencies in 33 countries. He finds that forecasts have a positive average bias and that this bias is
even stronger in economic booms.
6For instance, public polls show that voters prioritize economic issues and neglect environmental ones more during 2008
crisis.
http://www.people-press.org/2015/01/15/publics-policy-priorities-reflect-changing-conditions-at-home-and-abroad/
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technologically advanced (developed) country needs to emit less than a (developing) country that is not
as technologically advanced in order to generate the same economic surplus.
To address the consequences for IEAs of economic targets and loss-aversion, we develop a dynamic
game in which countries face a free-riding public goods problem and attempt to maintain cooperation in
their national emission strategies. Here, emitted pollution is assumed to be transboundary. We restrict
our attention to IEAs that are self-enforcing, as in Ferrara et al. (2009) and Hadjiyiannis et al. (2012),
since there is no supranational authority to enforce environmental policy mechanisms. In this context,
a country prefers to sustain cooperation on agreed-upon emission policies, as long as the discounted
future welfare losses from a breakdown in international environmental cooperation outweigh the one-
time gain of a unilateral deviation from the cooperative path. Note that we abstract completely from
any participation considerations, which have been at the center of IEA literature (Barrett, 1994; Carraro
and Siniscalco, 1993; D’Aspremont et al., 1983; Hoel, 1992).7 Instead, we look for the sustainability
of a cooperative emission level, particularly the most cooperative emission level, by countries aiming
to achieve their economic targets and that are averse to economic losses, within the context of a self-
enforcing IEA involving full participation. We compare the sustainability of a cooperative emission level
by different set of countries that vary in terms of their economic targets, economic target concerns, and
technology levels. We examine sets of countries that are both symmetric and asymmetric in terms of these
characteristics.8
We find that if a country has stronger economic target concerns, that is, it values its economic targets
more and/or becomes more averse to economic losses, then this country finds it more difficult to sus-
tain cooperation, but that this situation facilitates the sustainability in other countries owing to strategic
substitutability of emission levels. In the case that all countries have stronger economic target concerns,
sustaining an agreed-upon cooperative emission level might become easier for some sufficiently developed
countries but harder for some developing countries. So, an agreed cooperative emission level could not be
sustained after all countries having stronger economic target concerns if there is no transfer mechanism.
Furthermore, we show that a decrease in a country’s ability to sustain cooperation means the most
(lowest) cooperative emission level this country can sustain increases. Thus, the most cooperative emis-
sions countries can sustain can be ordered as follows: lowest in the case that no country cares about
economic targets; all countries reach their targets; and highest if no countries reach their targets.
We also find that it is more difficult to sustain a cooperative emission level if countries become more
asymmetric in their technology levels. In this case, the impact of further asymmetry in the level of eco-
nomic target concerns is ambiguous. Asymmetry in economic target concerns may correct the negative
impact of asymmetry in technology levels on sustaining cooperation if developing countries have weaker
and developed countries have stronger economic target concerns. Otherwise, it enters as another obsta-
cle for countries to support a greater degree of international environmental cooperation. These results
7See also the following more recent reviews of the literature: Barrett (2005) and Finus (2008).
8Much of the literature on IEAs examines the case of symmetric countries. However, some studies provide a theoretical
examination of countries that are asymmetric in terms of their size and marginal damage from pollution (Kolstad, 2010),
marginal costs and benefits of abatement (McGinty, 2007; Pavlova and de Zeeuw, 2013), and technologies (Mendez and Trelles,
2000).
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provide another perspective on why leaders have to be further motivated for greener policies by citizens
when they are to negotiate in the international arena.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets out the basics. Section 3 character-
izes the static Nash equilibrium of our model. Section 4 analyzes the dynamic game. Section 5 provides
two numerical analysis: the first one studies the impact of economic target concerns on the most coop-
erative emissions. The second one analyzes the model for technologically asymmetric countries, gives
insights of North-South model. Finally, Section 6 proposes concluding remarks and relates the predictions
of our model to the ongoing U.N. Climate Summits. The appendix contains some calculations and all the
proofs of propositions and lemma 1.
2 The Model
We assume the world consists of n countries.9 The countries have perfect information about the world,
and decide simultaneously on an emission level of a pollutant substance, xi 2 (0, 1). Emissions have a
negative environmental effect and give rise to negative externalities owing to transboundary effects. In
other words, emissions in country i pollute the environment in country i, as well as in other countries.
However, emissions are unavoidable for production, which creates surpluses for producers and consumers.
Our model builds on the work of Mendez and Trelles (2000) and incorporates countries’ economic targets
into the problem. The net-benefit function for country i, which also aims to reach its economic target, is
as follows:
Bi (x1, ..., xn) = bi (xi)  pi (x1, ..., xn) +  iti
 
xi, b
R
i
 
, (1)
where country i’s economic benefit bi (xi) depends only on its emissions, the cost of pollution pi (x1, ..., xn)
depends on all countries’ emission levels, and the target utility ti
 
xi, bRi
 
depends on the country’s emis-
sions and economic target bRi . The scaling factor  i > 0 measures how much country i cares about its
target utility relative to the benefits and costs of emissions. We assume the following functional forms:
bi (xi) = x
↵i
i (2)
pi (x1, ..., xn) = x
↵i
i
⇣
xi +
X
j 6=i xj
⌘
(3)
ti
 
xi, b
R
i
 
=
(  
bi (xi)  bRi
 
, if bi (.)   bRi
 i
 
bi (xi)  bRi
 
, otherwise
. (4)
A higher value of the country i’s exogenously determined technological inefficiency ↵i 2 (0, 1) requires
higher emissions to reach a given economic benefit. We call country i “developing” if it is technologically
inefficient (relatively high ↵i), and “developed” if it is technologically efficient (relatively low ↵i). We use
↵ ⌘ (↵1, ...,↵n) to denote the vector of countries’ technological inefficiency parameters and normalize
9For convenience, we use the word “country” to refer to both a country and its political leader.
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them,
nP
j=1
↵j = 1.
Note that the economic benefit function bi (xi) is strictly increasing, concave, and bi (0) = 0. The cost
of pollution pi (x1, ..., xn) is strictly increasing in all terms, pi (0, ..., 0) = 0, and has the following two
properties: (i) @pi@xj <
@pi
@xi
for j 6= i, and (ii) pi (x1, ..., xn) > pj (x1, ..., xn) if ↵i < ↵j . Property (i) implies
that a marginal increase in domestic emissions is more damaging than the same marginal increase in
another country. This means that either the emission has additional local effects beside the global effects,
or in addition to the real effects, it has psychological effects, such as people feeling guilty about their own
country’s emissions. Property (ii) implies that, regardless of sources, people in developed countries are
more environmentally aware and perceive more of environmental damage than people do in developing
countries.10
The target utility ti
 
xi, bRi
 
captures a country being averse to losing its economic benefits relative to
its economic target bRi . We can consider this to be country i’s economic reference level. In other words, if
the economic benefit reaches this level, bi (.)   bRi , then the country is satisfied by the positive difference,
which it perceives as a gain. On the other hand, if the economic benefit does not reach the target,
bi (.) < bRi , then the country is disappointed by this negative difference, which it perceives it as a loss.
Moreover, countries tend to strongly prefer avoiding economic losses to acquiring gains, relative to the
economic target. The loss-aversion parameter  i > 1 measures how country i values losses versus gains.
The function ti (.) is increasing in its emission level, decreasing in its economic target, and independent
of how much other countries emit.
The net-benefit function of country i with an economic target simplifies to the following:
Bi
 
x1, ..., xn,⇤i, b
R
i
 
=
8<: x
↵i
i
⇣
1 +  i   xi  
P
j 6=i xj
⌘
   ibRi , if bGi (.)   bRi
x↵ii
⇣
1 + ⇤i   xi  
P
j 6=i xj
⌘
  ⇤ibRi , otherwise
, (5)
where ⇤i =  i i < 1 captures the economic target concerns of country i in the loss domain. Country
i, with an economic target, initially maximizes the objective function in the first row, BGi (.). If the
economic benefit reaches the target, bGi (.)   bRi , then country i is in the gain domain and its net benefit
is determined. However, if the economic benefit does not reach its target, bGi (.)  bRi , then country i is in
the loss domain and maximizes the objective function in the second row, BLi (.).
11 For a standard country
i, there is no target utility in (1).
Any country i belongs one of the three types ✓i 2 {L,G, S}: that fails to reach its economic target (L);
that reaches its economic target (G); and with no economic target (S). We use ✓ ⌘ (✓1, ..., ✓n) to denote
the vector of countries’ types. In order to study the impact of different types of countries, we solve the
model for the case in which all countries fail to reach their economic targets. The results for the other
types of countries can be found by simply applying ⇤i =  i for any country i reaching its economic target
10Neumayer (2002) shows that democracies exhibit stronger international environmental commitment than non-democracies.
This supports property (ii) if one accepts that democracies are also more developed.
11For some parameter values, countries can fail to reach their economic target when maximizing BGi (.) and then reach their
economic target when maximizing BLi (.). This maximization procedure is to eliminate potential loops.
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(G), and ⇤i = 0 for any standard country i (S). Note that ⇤i increases as a country’s type changes in the
direction of S ! G! L.
3 Static Game
The aim of this section is to characterize the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium of n technologically asym-
metric countries with economic targets. The Nash equilibrium serves as a credible punishment or threat
to support international environmental cooperation in the repeated setting examined in the following
section.12
In the non-cooperative Nash solution, each country sets its emission level where the marginal benefit
is equal to the marginal cost. We find the best response function BRi and Nash emission for country i xNi
using the standard first-order condition @BLi (.) /@xi = 0, as well as some additional algebra:
@BLi (.)
@xi
= ↵ix
↵i 1
i
0@1 + ⇤i   xi  X
j 6=i
xj
1A  x↵ii = 0, (6)
The first-order condition shows that economic target concerns ⇤i increases the marginal benefit of emis-
sions. Multiplying the first-order condition by x1 ↵ii > 0 gives:
↵i
0@1 + ⇤i   nX
j=1
xj
1A  xi = 0 for i = 1, 2, ..., n, (7)
and determines the best response function for country i:
BRi (x i) =
↵i
 
1 + ⇤i  
P
j 6=i
xj
!
1 + ↵i
, (8)
where x i ⌘ (x1, ..., xi 1, xi+1, ..., xn). Note that country i’s emission level when it best responds to
other countries’ emissions increases in its economic target concerns, i.e., higher ⇤i, and as it becomes
technological less efficient, i.e., higher ↵i. Summing n equations in (7) and solving for the total emission
level gives:
nX
j=1
xNj =
nP
j=1
↵j +
nP
j=1
↵j⇤j
1 +
nP
j=1
↵j
, (9)
where xNj is country j’s Nash emission level. Substituting (9) into (7) and using
nP
j=1
↵j = 1 gives the Nash
emission level below:
12The static Nash equilibrium would be the unique equilibrium for the dynamic game as well if an IEA were not feasible (e.g.,
owing to exogenous, political reasons, or because countries are impatient and do not value the future.)
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xNi =
↵i
2
0@1 + ⇤i (2  ↵i) X
j 6=i
↵j⇤j
1A . (10)
Equation (10) shows that stronger country i’s economic target concern, that is, an increase in ⇤i, imply
a higher Nash emission level for country i. In other words, Nash emission level of a country with an
economic target places more value on the economic benefits than a standard type country does, and even
more so if it is a type L than G. On the other hand, a higher ⇤j for any other country j implies a lower
Nash emission level for country i. This is due to the environmental concern of country i about the higher
environmental pollution caused by country j. Note also that country i’s Nash emission level increases
as the country becomes technologically less efficient, i.e., higher ↵i, and as the other countries becomes
technologically more efficient, i.e., lower ↵j ’s.13
For any given types ✓, the Nash emission levels are inefficiently high (i.e., xOi < x
N
i for all i), where
the optimum level of emissions xO ⌘  xO1 , ..., xOn   maximizes the countries’ joint net-benefits nP
i=1
Bi. This
is because emissions are transboundary and the negative spillover effects are not internalized when the
countries act non-cooperatively.14
4 Dynamic Game
In this section we study the repeated interaction between countries. More precisely, the static game
analyzed in the previous section is repeated infinitely many times in the dynamic game, and countries
discount the future period by a discount factor   2 (0, 1). We focus on self-enforcing IEAs. Thus, countries
cannot make binding commitments. In such a setting, countries can sustain international environmental
cooperation, the degree of which depends on how severely they can credibly punish a deviator. Our aim
in this section is to examine the consequences of economic targets and loss-aversion for the sustainability
of a cooperative emission equilibrium in the framework of an IEA with full participation. Thus, our
framework is in line with the U.N. Climate Summits, in which participation has been almost universal.
Countries employ infinite Nash reversion strategies to enforce environmental cooperation.15 We focus
on cooperative subgame-perfect equilibria in which the following hold: (i) along the equilibrium path,
the countries implement cooperative emission levels in each period; and (ii) if at any point in the game
a defection occurs, all countries revert to non-cooperative Nash emission levels from the following period
onwards. Each country i will prefer to emit at the cooperative emission levels if its net benefit from
13See the appendix for calculations.
14Using the first order conditions, @
nP
i=1
BLi /@xi = 0, the optimum level of emissions under full symmetry becomes: xOi =
↵i(1+⇤i)
n(1+↵i)
. There are no closed-form solutions for optimum emissions in the case of asymmetry. Nevertheless, they are not needed
for the sustainability of IEAs.
15We employ infinite Nash reversion strategies for simplicity, but they have well-known credibility issues. Instead, we could
consider other strategies, such allowing renegotiation (Barrett, 1994; Asheim and Holtsmark, 2009). In these cases, the degree
of cooperation that any type of countries could sustain would be quantitatively different. Nevertheless, all the forces leading to
the qualitative results would remain the same.
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cooperating is no less than its payoff from defection. The latter payoff consists of a one-period gain from
deviation and the discounted net benefit of playing Nash reversion forever; that is:
1
1   Bi
 
xC ,⇤,↵, bRi
    Bi  BRi  xC i  , xC i,⇤,↵, bRi  +  1   Bi  xN ,⇤,↵, bRi   , (11)
where ⇤ ⌘ (⇤1, ...,⇤n) is the vector of economic target concerns, indicating also the country types ✓,
xC ⌘  xC1 , ..., xCn   is the vector of cooperative emission levels, and BRi  xC i  is the best response function
of country i when other countries emit at the agreed cooperative emission levels. From Friedman (1971),
we know that for a sufficiently high discount factor   and any given economic target concerns ⇤, there is a
subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium at a vector of cooperative emission levels xC , such that xCi 2
⇥
xCi , x
N
i
 
,
where xCi is the most cooperative emission level country i can sustain.
Substituting cooperative emissions xC , the best response function in (8), and Nash emission in (10)
into BLi (.) give the net benefit functions when all countries cooperate, when country i unilaterally devi-
ates while others continue to cooperate, and at the Nash emissions, respectively: 16
BLi
 
xC ,⇤,↵, bRi
 
=
 
xCi
 ↵i ⇣1 + ⇤i   xCi  Xj 6=i xCj ⌘  ⇤ibRi , (12)
BLi
 
BRi
 
xC i
 
, xC i,⇤,↵, b
R
i
 
=
1
↵i
✓
↵i
1 + ↵i
⇣
1 + ⇤i  
X
j 6=i x
C
j
⌘◆1+↵i
  ⇤ibRi , (13)
BLi
 
xNL1 , ..., x
NL
n ,⇤,↵, b
R
i
 
= ↵↵ii
0B@1 + ⇤i (2  ↵i) 
P
j 6=i
↵j⇤j
2
1CA
1+↵i
  ⇤ibRi . (14)
Similar to public goods game, we haveBi
 
BRi
 
xC i
 
, xC i,⇤,↵, bRi
 
> Bi
 
xC ,⇤,↵, bRi
 
> Bi
 
xN ,⇤,↵, bRi
 
.
We take the terms on the RHS over to the LHS in (11) and call this country i’s sustainability function
Si
 
xC ,⇤,↵,  
 
. Substituting (12), (13), and (14) into (11) give the sustainability function, Si (.) =
 
xCi
 ↵i
1   
⇣
1 + ⇤i   xCi  
X
j 6=i x
C
j
⌘
 
✓
↵i(1+⇤i 
P
j 6=i xCj )
1+↵i
◆1+↵i
↵i
   ↵
↵i
i
1   
0B@1 + ⇤i (2  ↵i) 
P
j 6=i
↵j⇤j
2
1CA
1+↵i
.
(15)
Given the parameters of the model, the sustainability function gives non-negative values for sustainable
cooperative emission levels, and gives negative values for unsustainable cooperative emission levels. In
this paper, our main concern is how the economic target concerns affect the sustainability of an agreed
cooperative emissions. An increase in country i’s economics target concerns ⇤i does only increase the
impact of the target utility. It means that the impact of this increase depends on the levels of the economic
benefit bi (.) and the economic target bRi . Note that the economic target parameters in Si (.) cancel each
other out
⇣
⇤ibRi
⇣
1
1     1   1  
⌘
= 0
⌘
. Thus, the country’s economic target only determines its type, but
has no other effect on sustainability. Therefore, given the types, the impact of an increase in economic
16More detailed calculations are provided in the appendix.
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target concerns on sustainability depends on the economic benefit levels when country i cooperates bCi ⌘
bi
 
xCi
 
, when it unilaterally deviates while others continue to cooperate bDi ⌘ bi
 
BRi
 
xC i
  
, and at the
Nash emissions bNi ⌘ bi
 
xNi
 
.
Our first proposition describes the impact on sustaining a cooperative emission level if country i is
more concerned about its economic target. This increase in economic target concerns can be due country
i’s type changing in the direction of S ! G! L.
Proposition 1 Given any cooperative emission levels xC , technological inefficiencies with
nP
j=1
↵j = 1, eco-
nomic target concerns ⇤, and a common discount factor  , if country i is more concerned about its economic
target, i.e., higher ⇤i, then
(i) it is more difficult to sustain cooperation at the agreed cooperative emission xC for country i, i.e.,
@Si/@⇤i < 0, and
(ii) it is easier for any country j to sustain cooperation at xC , i.e., @Sj/@⇤i > 0.
An increase in country i’s economic target concerns increases its marginal benefit from emission.
Since xCi < x
N
i < BRi(x
C i) for any ✓, the economic benefits at these emission levels are ordered as
follows: bCi < b
N
i < b
D
i . Furthermore, while country i’s cooperative emission level does not change, its
Nash emission level and emission level when it unilaterally deviates from the cooperative emission level
increases in ⇤i. These imply a stronger incentive to deviate and, thus, a decrease in Si (.). Sustaining
cooperation at xC becomes more difficult for country i. On the other hand, an increase in ⇤i for any
other country j only decreases country j’s Nash emission level because of the strategic substitutability of
countries’ emission levels, thus lowering its incentive to deviate from the agreed cooperative emissions.
Therefore, sustaining cooperation at xC becomes easier for country j.
Next, we discuss the impact on sustaining a cooperative emission level if all countries are more con-
cerned about their economic targets. To this end, we increase the economic target concerns uniformly,
while still allowing these concerns to be different from each other.
Proposition 2 Given any cooperative emission levels xC , technological inefficiencies with
nP
j=1
↵j = 1, eco-
nomic target concerns ⇤, and a common discount factor  , an equal increase in all countries economic target
concerns, d⇤i = d⇤j 8ij, impedes country i sustaining cooperation at xC if dSi = @Si@⇤i d⇤i+
P
j 6=i
@Si
@⇤j
d⇤j <
0,
bCi   (1   ) bDi +
1
2
(1 + ↵i)   (n  3  ↵i (n  2)) bNi < 0. (16)
(i) If ↵i  n 3n 2 , which requires n   4, then bNi enters non-negatively and the inequality (16) does not
hold for sufficiently large  . Otherwise, bNi enters negatively and the inequality (16) or the opposite can hold.
(ii) It is easier for the inequality (16) to hold for a lower xCi and higher x
C
j ’s.
While Proposition 1 examines the impact of one country being more concerned about its economic
targets, Proposition 2 examines the impact of all countries having stronger concerns about their economic
targets. Thus, for each of n countries, there are two effects, as discussed in Proposition 1: (i) an increase
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in ⇤i hinders sustaining cooperation for country i, but (ii) facilitates cooperation for any other country j.
If the inequality (16) holds, Proposition 1’s (i) dominates (ii) when all countries have stronger economic
target concerns. If the opposite of inequality (16) holds strictly, then (ii) dominates (i).
The first point in Proposition 2 states that if there are sufficiently many and patient countries, (ii)
dominates (i) for a technologically not very inefficient country i. If any of these conditions fail to hold,
then depending on the specific parameter values (i) or (ii) dominates the other. To gain more insight into
this, first note that the number of countries and countries’ technological inefficiencies are linked due to
the normalization,
nP
j=1
↵j = 1. An increase in the number of countries requires at least some countries to
become technologically more efficient. For any given number of countries, a country i being sufficiently
technologically efficient and, thus sufficiently environmentally aware, imply the other countries to be
sufficiently technologically inefficient and environmentally unaware. For such a developed country i,
the effect (ii) would become stronger, since increase in Nash emission levels owing to the increase in
economic target concerns would be smaller; and, the effect (i) would be weaker, since increase in Nash
emission levels and emission levels when country i unilaterally deviates from the cooperative emission
level owing to the increase in economic target concerns would be smaller. Note that if (i) dominates (ii)
for some countries and they cannot sustain cooperation at xC anymore, then IEA would breaks down.
note that for countries to continue sustaining cooperation at the agreed cooperative emission levels
anymore, then that
The second point in Proposition 2 states that if country i agrees on a more cooperative emission level
xCi or some other countries j’s agree on a less cooperative emission levels x
C
j ’s, then it is easier for the
inequality (16) to hold. The intuition is straightforward: a more cooperative (lower) emission level xCi
would reduce country i’s economic benefit at cooperative emission level and a less cooperative emission
levels xCj ’s would increase country i’s economic benefit when it unilaterally deviates from the cooperative
emissions.
4.1 Sustainability, the Critical Discount Factor, and the Most Cooperative Emissions
In all the propositions, we study how changes in economic target concerns, either country i’s or any other
country j’s or all countries, affect the sustainability a cooperative emission level, given the agreed upon
cooperative emission levels xC and a common discount factor  . Alternatively, we could study the impact
of economic target concerns on the critical discount factor above which xC can be sustained by country i
or on the most cooperative (minimum) cooperative emission levels xC for a given  . To this end, first we
solve the no-defection condition (11) for   and obtain the critical discount factor above which xC can be
sustained by country i:17
     i(xC ,⇤,↵) =
BDi  BCi
BDi  BNi
, (17)
17See the appendix for more detailed calculations.
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where BCi , B
D
i , and B
N
i are abbreviations of the net benefit function when all countries cooperate, when
country i unilaterally deviates while others continue to cooperate, and at the Nash emissions, respectively.
At its critical discount factor  i(xC ,⇤,↵), country i can just sustain the agreed cooperative emissions xC ,
thus, its sustainability function equals to zero, Si
 
xC ,⇤,↵,  i
 
= 0.
So far, we have studied how changes in economic target concerns affect countries sustaining cooper-
ation at a xC . Next, we study the relationship between country i’s ability to sustain cooperation at a xC
and its critical discount factor. This allows us to interpret our previous results from the perspective of
countries’ patience levels.
Lemma 1 Given any cooperative emission levels xC , technological inefficiencies with
nP
j=1
↵j = 1, economic
target concerns ⇤, if country i’s ability to sustain cooperation at xC increases (decreases) for some reason
other than discount factor   and cooperative emission levels xC , S0i(xC ,  i) > (<)Si(xC ,  i), then the critical
(minimum) discount factor above which xC can be sustained by country i decreases (increases),  0i(xC) <
(>) i(x
C).
If country i’s ability to sustain cooperation at xC has increased for whatever reason other than  i and
xC , then the critical discount factor before the increase does not bind for sustaining cooperation at xC .
This means that country i can sustain agreed cooperative emission xC with some discount factors lower
than the critical discount factor before the increase. Thus, the critical discount factor decreases after the
increase in country i’s ability to sustain cooperation at xC . A decrease in critical discount factor  i(xC)
means even some other relatively impatient country i’s can start sustaining cooperation at xC . Similarly,
a decrease in country i’s ability to sustain cooperation at xC requires  i(.) to increase and, thus, only
sufficiently patient country i’s can continue sustaining cooperation at xC .
Next, we study the relationship between country i’s ability to sustain cooperation at xC and the most
cooperative emission level it can sustain. This allows us to interpret our previous results from the per-
spective of lowest emissions countries can sustain.
Proposition 3 Given any technological inefficiencies with
nP
j=1
↵j = 1, economic target concerns ⇤, and a
sufficiently high discount factor  i of country i,
(i) If country i’s ability to sustain cooperation at xC increases (decreases) for some reason other than
discount factor  i and cooperative emission levels xC , i.e., S0i(xC ,  i) > (<)Si(xC ,  i), then country i’s most
cooperative emission decreases (increases), x0Ci < (>)xCi .
(ii) If all countries’ abilities to sustain cooperation at xC increase (decrease) for some reason other than
discount factor  i and cooperative emission levels, xC , i.e., S0i(xC ,  i) > (<)Si(xC ,  i) for all i, then the most
cooperative emission levels countries can sustain decrease (increase), x0C < (>)xC in all dimensions.
The intuition behind the Proposition 3 is similar to the one underlying Lemma 1. Basically, after any
country’s ability to sustain cooperation at xC increases for whatever reason other than its discount factor
and cooperative emission, the critical discount factor before the increase does not bind for sustaining
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cooperation at xC . This means that countries with higher ability to sustain cooperation at xC can support
greater degree of international environmental cooperation.
An interesting point is that a country j’s ability to sustain cooperation at xC increases as xCi decreases
if bCj > b
D
j (1    ).18 This means that country i becoming more cooperative in its emission level allows
some sufficiently patient countries to also emit more cooperatively.
5 Extensions
5.1 Symmetric Countries
In this subsection, we assume countries to be symmetric. More specifically, we assume countries to be
identical in their technological inefficiencies, ↵i = 1/n for any i, economic target concerns, ⇤i = ⇤j , and
agreed cooperative emission levels, xCi = x
C
j 8 ij. As in proposition 2, we study the impact of all countries
being more concerned about their economic targets.
Proposition 4 Given technological inefficiencies ↵i = 1/n for any i, a common discount factor  , and iden-
tical economic target concerns ⇤i = ⇤j 8ij, the most cooperative emission level country i can sustain xCi
increases in economic target concerns if i.e., @Si/ @⇤i < 0,
bCi < (1   ) bDi +
 
2
✓
n+ 1
n
◆
bNi . (18)
Basically, the condition (16) simplifies to the condition (18) under symmetry. To investigate further
this scenario, we also resort a numerical analysis. We assume that there are two countries i and j,
identical in their technological inefficiencies ↵i = ↵j = 1/2, in their types ✓i = ✓j , in their discount factor
 i =  j = 0.99, and agree to cooperate by emitting the same amount xCi = x
C
j . Moreover, we assume that
economic target concerns are ⇤Li = ⇤
L
j = 0.3 for loss, ⇤
G
i = ⇤
G
j = 0.15 for gain, and ⇤
S
i = ⇤
S
i = 0 for
standard types. We summarize the findings in Figure 1. It shows how sustainability functions changes
against emissions with any country i’s type ✓i 2 {L,G, S}. The red dotted, blue dashed, and continuous
black curves represent countries being loss (L), gain (G), and standard (S) types, respectively. Each
curve intersect the zero value line twice: the smaller emission level is the most cooperative emission level
countries can sustain and the higher emission level is the Nash emission level.
For sufficiently high  , we find that for some relatively high (less) cooperative emission levels the
condition (18) does not hold, meaning that a joint increase in economic target concerns can increase the
sustainability for such relatively high (less) cooperative emissions. On the other hand, if the countries
agree on a low (more) cooperative emission level, then a joint increase in economic target concerns
decreases the sustainability functions and, thus, the most cooperative emission levels of loss, gain, and
standard types of countries are ordered as follows: xCLi > x
CG
i > x
CS
i , for any i. Therefore, economic
18See the appendix for detailed calculations.
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Figure 1: The most cooperative emissions
target concerns could be another reason preventing countries to support a greater degree of international
environmental agreements.
5.2 Asymmetry in Technology
Next, we examine the impact of countries becoming more or less asymmetric in their technologies, in
addition to their possibly asymmetric economic target concerns. This analysis allows us to study a North–
South relations model as well as a North–North model. To this end, we employ a numerical analysis with
two countries to incorporate how technological inefficiencies ↵i and ↵j , with ↵i + ↵j = 1, and different
types ✓ = (✓i, ✓j) affect countries’ ability to sustain cooperation. Figure 2 contains two subfigures. Each
shows how the sustainability of a symmetric cooperative emission, set to xC = (0.22, 0.22) here, against
country i’s technological inefficiency ↵i changes with country i’s type ✓i 2 {L,G, S}. The two subfigures
differ by the other country j’s type ✓j 2 {L, S}. Bold sustainability functions belong to country i and
light sustainability functions belong country j. The red dotted, blue dashed, and continuous black curves
represent country i being in a loss (L), gain (G), and standard (S) domain, respectively.
In both subfigures, the symmetry in technologies helps to sustain cooperation. The developing country
fails to sustain cooperation if countries are sufficiently asymmetric in their technologies. For instance, in
Subfigure 2a, where ✓j = L, cooperation can be sustained by both countries at approximately ↵i 2
(0.52; 0.62), ↵i 2 (0.46; 0.58), and ↵i 2 (0.44; 0.56) for ✓i= S, G, and L, respectively. Country i can sustain
cooperation for values of ↵i below the upper limit and country j can do so for values of ↵i above the lower
limit. As ⇤i increases, in other words, as the country i’s type changes in the direction of S ! G! L, the
upper limit decreases, and sustaining cooperation becomes more difficult for country i. At the same time,
the lower limit increases, making it easier for country j to sustain cooperation, as shown in Proposition 1.
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(a) Type ✓i 2 (L,G, S) and type ✓j = L
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(b) Type ✓i 2 (L,G, S) and type ✓j = S
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Figure 2: The net benefit of sustaining cooperation at xC = (0.22, 0.22) for country type pair ✓ = (✓i, ✓j),
when the loss-aversion parameter  i = 1.5 and the scaling factor  i = 0.1, for all i, and technological inef-
ficiency ↵i, when ↵i+↵j = 1, at discount factor   = 0.99. Countries sustain cooperation for non-negative
values. Bold sustainability functions represent country i and light sustainability functions represent coun-
try j. The red dotted, blue dashed, and continuous black lines represent country i’s type being L, G, and
S, respectively.
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In the case of technological asymmetries, an increase in economic target concerns might help or hinder
sustaining a cooperative emission. Figure 2 shows that the more developed country can sustain cooper-
ation at the agreed upon emission level regardless of the economic target concerns. However, economic
target concerns do matter for the sustainability of the less developed country. if country i is less developed
(i.e., ↵i’s > 0.5), regardless of economic target concerns of the other country j, having stronger economic
target concerns hinders its ability to sustain cooperation at the agreed upon emission level. On the other
hand, the more developed county j having stronger economic target concerns facilitate sustaining coop-
eration for the less developed country i. Thus, the best scenario for the countries to sustain cooperation is
the developing country i has weaker and the developed country j has stronger economic target concerns.
However, if one considers that developed countries have more established political and economic institu-
tions and would have weaker economic target concerns than developing countries, then economic target
concerns enter as another difficulty for supporting substantial international environmental cooperation.
5.3 Comparative analysis with Economic Targets
In all our propositions, we focus on the impact of countries being more concerned about their economic
targets ⇤. Alternatively, we could examine the impact of countries having more ambitious economic
targets bR. This may lead to two possible scenarios. First, if a country continues to be in a gain or loss
after an increase in its economic target bRi , then its objective function does not change. In this case, its
emission level and sustainability functions remain the same. Second, if a country starts failing to reach
its economic benefit after an increase in its economic target, then it will start maximizing BLi (.). In this
case, it will have stronger concerns about its economic targets. Therefore, the second scenario leads to
identical implications discussed in the propositions.
6 Conclusion
Motivated by the fact that many policy decisions are often influenced by political parties’ incentives to be
elected, we examine the implications for IEAs on transboundary emissions of countries being motivated
to reach their economic targets and being averse to failing to achieve their economic targets. More
specifically, we examine whether countries having stronger economic target concerns help or hinder the
sustainability of agreed upon cooperative emissions in the context of self-enforcing IEAs, that is, involving
full participation.
We find that the stronger the concern of a country about its economic targets, the more difficult it is
for the country to sustain cooperation, but the easier it is for other countries to do so. If all countries have
stronger economic target concerns and are sufficiently patient, then it can facilitate sustaining cooperation
for a sufficiently developed countries in the presence of developing countries, but the effect it ambigu-
ous for a developing country. If the countries are symmetric in all dimensions, then countries having
stronger economic target concerns hinders sustaining cooperation. This means that countries needs to be
much more patient to continue sustaining the agreed cooperative emission levels or the most cooperative
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emission levels countries can sustain increase for the same patience level.
The real IEAs, such as climate change, are much more complex than the simple model utilized here.
They require international coordination to agree on the cooperative emission levels, in which countries
often fail to keep their promises. We show that even in a world in which sustaining the most cooperative
emissions is effortless, ambitious economic targets owing to an incentive to be elected lead to IEAs with
less cooperative emission levels than could be achieved without such concerns.
Thaler and Sunstein (2008), in their highly influential book, suggest nudges. It is a design of a choice
environment using frames and defaults, among others, that alters people’s behavior in a predictable way,
without mandating a particular action or changing economic incentives, in order to overcome behavioral
failures. However, the impact of nudges is limited if policymakers suffer from such behavioral failures,
either directly or through voters, as discussed in the introduction. While a political party can frame the
climate change problem to alter behavior to promote greener policies (e.g., Al Gore), another can frame
it to favor inaction (e.g., the Bush administration).19
It appears that correcting the incentives leading to ambitious economic targets and an aversion to
economic losses require a strong call for action at the sub-national level. As citizens of the earth, we
should talk more about the environmental problems and raise public awareness to incentivize political
parties to pursue greener policies.20
Appendix: Calculations and Proofs
Calculations:
Technological inefficiency and Nash emissions:
@xNi
@↵i
=
1
2
0@1 + ⇤i (2  ↵i) X
j 6=i
↵j⇤j
1A  ↵i
2
⇤i
=
1
2
0@1 + 2⇤i (1  ↵i) X
j 6=i
↵j⇤j
1A > 0
(19)
It is straightforward to see @xNi /@↵j < 0.
Net benefit functions:
It is straightforward to see that substituting cooperative emissions into BLi (.) gives (12). Let’s substi-
tute the best response function in (8) into BLi (.) to find the net benefit function when country i unilater-
19See Gsottbauer and van den Bergh (2013) for the details of these frames.
20Communication and raising public awareness is one of the four strategic priorities of the U.N. Environmental Programme’s
climate change programme. http://www.unep.org/pdf/UNEP_CC_STRATEGY_web.pdf
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ally deviates while others continue to cooperate, BLi
⇣
BRi
⇣
xCj
⌘
, xCj , b
R
i
⌘
=
=
0@ ↵i
1 + ↵i
(1 + ⇤i  
X
j 6=i
xCj )
1A↵i0@1 + ⇤i  X
j 6=i x
C
j  
↵i
1 + ↵i
(1 + ⇤i  
X
j 6=i
xCj )
1A  ⇤ibRi
=
0@ ↵i
1 + ↵i
(1 + ⇤i  
X
j 6=i
xCj )
1A↵i0@ 1
1 + ↵i
(1 + ⇤i  
X
j 6=i
xCj )
1A  ⇤ibRi
=
1
↵i
✓
↵i
1 + ↵i
⇣
1 + ⇤i  
X
j 6=i x
C
j
⌘◆1+↵i
  ⇤ibRi
(20)
We substitute Nash emission in (10) into BLi (.). Using the (9) and some algebra give the net benefit
at the Nash emissions, BLi
 
xNL1 , ..., x
NL
n , b
R
i
 
=
=
 
xNLi
 ↵i  1 + ⇤i   nX
i=1
xNLi
!
  ⇤ibRi
=
0@↵i
2
0@1 + ⇤i (2  ↵i) X
j 6=i
↵j⇤j
1A1A↵i
0BBB@1 + ⇤i  
1 +
nP
j=1
↵j⇤j
2
1CCCA  ⇤ibRi
=↵↵ii
0@1
2
0@1 + ⇤i (2  ↵i) X
j 6=i
↵j⇤j
1A1A↵i 1
2
0@1 + 2⇤i   nX
j=1
↵j⇤j
1A  ⇤ibRi
=↵↵ii
0@1
2
0@1 + ⇤i (2  ↵i) X
j 6=i
↵j⇤j
1A1A↵i 1
2
⇣
1 + ⇤i(2  ↵i) 
X
j 6=i ↵j⇤j
⌘
  ⇤ibRi
=↵↵ii
0B@1 + ⇤i (2  ↵i) 
P
j 6=i
↵j⇤j
2
1CA
1+↵i
  ⇤ibRi
(21)
Critical Discount Factor
The conditions (11) and (17) are equivalent. For notational simplicity, let us use BCi , B
BR
i , and B
N
i
for net benefit functions when all countries cooperate, when country i unilaterally deviates while others
continue to cooperate, and at the Nash emissions, respectively.
1
1   B
C
i   BBRi +
 
1   B
N
i ,
BCi   (1   )BBRi +  BNi ,
 
 
BBRi  BNi
    BBRi  BCi ,
    B
BR
i  BCi
BBRi  BNi
(22)
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Interdependence of Countries’ Most Cooperative Emissions
@Sj
@xCi
=  (x
C
j )
↵j
1    +
✓
↵j
1 + ↵j
⇣
1 + ⇤j  
X
i 6=j x
C
i
⌘◆↵j
,
=   b
C
j
1    + b
D
j
(23)
For @Sj
@xCi
< 0, we should have: bCj > b
D
j (1   ).
Proofs:
Proof of Proposition 1.
We take the derivative with respect to (i) ⇤i =  i i:
@Si
@⇤i
=
1
1   
 
xCi
 ↵i| {z }
bCi
 
 
1 + ⇤i  
P
j 6=i x
C
j
1 + ↵i
!↵i
| {z }
bBRi
  (2  ↵i) (1 + ↵i)  
2 (1   ) ↵
↵i
i
✓
1 + (2  ↵i)⇤i  
P
j 6=i ↵j⇤j
2
◆↵i
| {z }
bNLi
.
(24)
For country i’s sustainability to decrease in its economic target concerns, @Si@⇤i < 0,
bCi <  
1
2
(2  ↵i) (1 + ↵i)| {z }
>1
bNLi + (1   ) bBRi . (25)
Since xNLi > x
C
i and BRi
 
xC i
 
> xCi , we have b
NL
i > b
C
i and b
BR
i > b
C
i . Then, any point in convex
combination of bNLi and b
BR
i is also higher than b
C
i , which completes part (i) of the proof.
Let us now take the derivative of Sj with respect to (ii) ⇤i =  i i:
@Sj
@⇤i
= (1 + ↵j)
 
1    ↵
↵j
j
✓
1 + (2  ↵j)⇤j  
P
i 6=j ↵i⇤i
2
◆↵j
| {z }
bNLj
P
i 6=j ↵i
2
> 0 (26)
This condition always holds because it is the same condition required for the Nash emissions to be
positive in (10), completing the proof of part (ii).
Proof of Proposition 2. Total derivation of the sustainability function with respect to countries economic
target concerns, dSi = @Si@⇤i d⇤i +
P
j 6=i
@Si
@⇤j
d⇤j:
dSi =
✓
bCi
1      b
BR
i  
(2  ↵i) (1 + ↵i)  
2 (1   ) b
NL
i
◆
d⇤i +
X
j 6=i
(1 + ↵i)  
P
j 6=i ↵j
2 (1   ) b
NL
i d⇤j (27)
Note that
P
j 6=i ↵j = 1   ↵i. The sustainability of country i increases by an equal increase in all
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countries economic target concerns (d⇤i = d⇤ 8i) if dSi > 0,
bCi   (1   ) bBRi  
(2  ↵i) (1 + ↵i)  
2
bNLi + (n  1)
(1 + ↵i)   (1  ↵i)
2
bNLi > 0,
bCi   (1   ) bBRi +
(1 + ↵i)  
2
bNLi ((n  1) (1  ↵i)  2 + ↵i) > 0,
bCi   (1   ) bBRi +
(1 + ↵i)  
2
bNLi (n  3  ↵i (n  2)) > 0
(28)
(i) The last parenthesis becomes positive if ↵i  n 3n 2 , which also requires n   4. In this case, the
condition (16) does not hold for sufficiently large  . Otherwise, we need to know specific parameter
values in order to determine whether the condition (16) holds or not.
(ii) It is easier for the condition (16) to hold for a lower xCi , since the only term that depends on it in
the condition (16) is bCi , which decreases for a lower x
C
i . On the other hand, It is easier for the condition
(16) to hold for higher xCj ’s, since the only term that depends on them in the condition (16) is b
D
i , which
increases for higher xCj ’s.
Proof of Lemma 1. Given the parameters of the model, let  i(xC) be the critical discount factor so that
Si(xC ,  i) = 0. Suppose, for some reason other than discount factor  i and cooperative emissions xC ,
country i’s sustainability increases, S0i(xC ,  i) > Si(xC ,  i) = 0. Therefore, there exists another  0i such
that S0i(xC ,  0i) = 0 and  0i(.) <  i(.).
Proof of Proposition 3.
(i) Suppose country i’s sustainability increases for some reason other than its discount factor  i and co-
operative emissions xC . We know by lemma 1 that if S0i(xC ,  i) > Si(xC ,  i) for any cooperative emissions
xC , then  0i(xC) <  i(xC). Furthermore, from (17), we have
BDi  BCi =  i(xC)
 
BDi  BNi
 
B0Di  B0Ci =  0i(xC)
 
B0Di  B0Ni
  (29)
Since  0i(xC) <  i(xC):
B0Di  B0Ci <  i(xC)
 
B0Di  B0Ni
 , 
1   i(xC)
 
B0Di < B
0C
i    i(xC)B0Ni ,
(30)
meaning that the no-defection condition (17) does not bind for country i at the
 
xC ,  i(x
C)
 
pair. Note
that BNi does not depend on the cooperative emissions. Moreover, B
D
i does not depend on country i’s
cooperative emissions. Thus, country i can sustain cooperation at xˆC such that xˆCi < x
C
i and xˆ
C
j = x
C
j for
any j. Since these arguments apply to any
 
xCi ,  i(x
C)
 
pair for any  i(xC) that countries can maintain
some cooperation, we have that for any such  , x0Ci < xCi .
(ii) Let all countries’ sustainability functions increases for some reason other than its discount factors
and cooperative emissions. For any country i, the condition (30) does hold. For any cooperative emissions
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xC lower than xC in all dimensions, net benefit under defection is higher at xC than at xC :
Bi
 
BRi
 
xC i
 
, xC i,⇤, b
R
i
 
> Bi
 
BRi
 
xC i
 
, xC i,⇤, b
R
i
 
(31)
Furthermore, for such a xC < xC , net benefit under cooperation is also higher at xC than at xC :
Bi
 
xC ,⇤,↵, bRi
 
> Bi
 
xC ,⇤,↵, bRi
 
(32)
By the continuity of Bi (.), there exist a cooperative emissions vector x˜C < xC such that for any country
i the condition (30) still holds. Since these arguments apply to any
 
xCi ,  i(x
C)
 
pair for any  i(xC) that
countries can maintain some cooperation, we have that for any such  , x0C < xC .
Proof of Proposition 4.
Country i’s sustainability function under symmetry:
S=i =
 
xC
 1/n
1   
 
1 + ⇤i   nxCi
   n✓ 1
n+ 1
 
1 + ⇤i   (n  1)xCi
 ◆n+1n    (1/n)1/n
1   
✓
1 + ⇤i
2
◆n+1
n
. (33)
We take the derivative with respect to ⇤i in order to capture the impact of having different degrees of
economic target concerns ⇤i or types changing in the direction of S ! G! L.:
@S=i
@⇤i
=
 
xCi
 1/n
1     
✓
1
n+ 1
 
1 + ⇤i   (n  1)xCi
 ◆1/n   ✓n+ 1
n
◆
 
2 (1   )(1/n)
1/n
✓
1 + ⇤i
2
◆1/n
(34)
Any country’s sustainability decreases as its economic target concerns increase, @S
=
i
@⇤i
< 0,
 
xCi
 1/n| {z }
bCi
< (1   )
✓
1
n+ 1
 
1 + ⇤i   (n  1)xCi
 ◆1/n
| {z }
bDi
+
 
2
✓
n+ 1
n
◆✓
(1 + ⇤i)
2n
◆1/n
| {z }
bNi
. (35)
By proposition 2, we know that if all countries sustainability functions decrease, then the most coop-
erative emissions countries can sustain increases, completing the proof.
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